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Deceiving Image-to-Image Translation Networks for
Autonomous Driving with Adversarial Perturbations
Lin Wang, Wonjune Cho, and Kuk-Jin Yoon
Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved im-
pressive performance on handling computer vision problems,
however, it has been found that DNNs are vulnerable to ad-
versarial examples. For such reason, adversarial perturbations
have been recently studied in several respects. However, most
previous works have focused on image classification tasks, and
it has never been studied regarding adversarial perturbations
on Image-to-image (Im2Im) translation tasks, showing great
success in handling paired and/or unpaired mapping problems
in the field of autonomous driving and robotics. This paper
examines different types of adversarial perturbations that can
fool Im2Im frameworks for autonomous driving purpose. We
propose both quasi-physical and digital adversarial perturbations
that can make Im2Im models yield unexpected results. We then
empirically analyze these perturbations and show that they gen-
eralize well under both paired for image synthesis and unpaired
settings for style transfer. We also validate that there exist
some perturbation thresholds over which the Im2Im mapping
is disrupted or impossible. The existence of these perturbations
reveals that there exist crucial weaknesses in Im2Im models.
Lastly, we show that our methods illustrate how perturbations
affect the quality of outputs, pioneering the improvement of the
robustness of current SOTA networks for autonomous driving.
Index Terms—Im2Im, adversarial attack, autonomous driving.
I. INTRODUCTION
DEEP neural networks (DNNs) are remarkably successfulon handling many computer vision tasks, however, they
have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations
of inputs [15]. The adversarial perturbations are physically
and digitally distorted input examples that can attack and fool
the learned model such that it would produce an intentionally
fabricated or an unexpected result [15]. DNNs for many visual
intelligence tasks, such as image classification [15], [9], [21],
segmentation [20], and detection [3], are shown to be highly
vulnerable to them. However, it has never been examined
how much and what kinds of perturbations are detrimental to
image-to-image (Im2Im) tasks. Im2Im frameworks are essen-
tially more complex and sophisticated than pure classification-
related problems.
Im2Im translation methods have shown considerable suc-
cess in transforming images from one domain to another
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Fig. 1: Examples of proposed adversarial perturbations. First row
shows the result of a quasi-physical adversarial perturbation. From
left to right, perturbed input (R = 2◦), output with perturbation,
output without perturbation, and target. Second row shows the result
of an image-agnostic perturbation. From left to right, conditional
input, output with perturbation, output without perturbation, and
visualization of perturbation (Pu = {0.2,2000,∞}). Third row shows
the result of a flow-based perturbation on style transfer. From left
to right, perturbed image, output with perturbation, output without
perturbation, and visualization of perturbation (ξ f = 1). Our methods
can fool Im2Im networks only with tiny perturbations.
based on DNNs using paired [11], [23] or unpaired data
[32]. Recently, Im2Im networks have been broadly applied
to the research of autonomous driving and robotics [28], [7].
For instance, Im2Im networks can be used for generating
realistic environments in simulation for training self-driving
car policies. Besides, Im2Im networks can be applied to study
the way humans drive and either imitating human drivers
exactly or inferring the goals that human drivers have and
learning policies that accomplish the same goals better.
In this paper, we demonstrate the existence of physical
and imperceptible or quasi-imperceptible digital perturbations
leading to the malfunctioning of Im2Im tasks for autonomous
driving applications. Actually, there exist many uncertainties
in the current Im2Im frameworks regarding to their robustness
and reliability. For instance, when a network fails to produce
a desired output because of inconspicuous perturbations as
in the horse2zebra [13] examples shown in later sections,
many would doubt the robustness of the network before
questioning the dataset. Therefore, it is quite imperative that
we validate the reliability and robustness of Im2Im networks
against different types of perturbations, especially to prepare
the dataset and to design the networks for autonomous driving
applications. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
about the adversarial perturbations to more complex Im2Im
networks, focusing more on autonomous driving applications.
We base our focus more on black-box attacks for Im2Im
networks, where the adversary has no knowledge about the
network structure as in [24], and propose both quasi-physical
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adversarial perturbations (i.e. using 2D transformation models)
and digital adversarial perturbations (i.e. changing pixel values
or positions) that fool the Im2Im networks.
We summarize our main contributions as follows: (I) We are
the first to systematically present effective adversarial attack
mechanisms for Im2Im, especially for autonomous driving.
We show that there exist perturbations on images that can de-
molish the mapping from one domain to another, and through
examining perturbations, this paper unlocks important factors
that affect the mapping results but have not been considered
before. (II) We propose three novel perturbation methods for
both paired and unpaired settings, and show existing Im2Im
networks are vulnerable to these perturbations. (III) We find
that quasi-physical adversarial perturbations actually matter
seriously to the Im2Im networks. Meanwhile, we find there
exist some perturbation patterns and thresholds of digital
adversarial perturbations causing mapping to collapse. (IV)
We empirically analyze these perturbations and show that
they generalize well under both paired and unpaired settings.
We also show that our methods illustrate how the perceptual
quality of outputs changes w.r.t the variation of perturbations.
II. RELATED WORKS
Im2Im for autonomous driving and robotics. Im2Im aims
at translating images from one domain to another. In recent
years, Im2Im frameworks have been applied to autonomous
driving applications, such as semantic segmentation[30], scene
understanding [8], path planning[28], data augmentation [27],
etc. Meanwhile, they are also widely used for robots [22],
[14], [26] and medical imaging [17], [18]. Im2Im networks are
usually divided into two categories. The first one builds on the
paired input-output images to learn a mapping model based
on conditional generative adversarial networks (cGANs), as
in [11], [23]. The other one tackles the problem when there
are no paired images, and instead, tries to learn a general
mapping model in unpaired settings, as in [32], [16] using
unsupervised learning. The aforementioned approaches all rely
on task-specific and predefined similarity functions between
inputs and outputs. However, they never consider the reliability
and robustness of the translation frameworks, which can be
disrupted by the perturbations added to input and targeted
images and are very crucial for autonomous driving and
robotic applications.
Adversarial perturbations. In general, perturbations can be
categorized into two types: universal (image-agnostic) and
image-dependent. [20], [19] introduce universal perturbation
methods based on DeepFool [21]. In contrast, [25] present
an image-dependent perturbation method for classification and
detection tasks. On the other hand, depending on the objectives
of adversarial perturbations, they can be also divided into tar-
geted and non-targeted perturbations. The goal of the targeted
perturbation is to make the network produce a targeted output
with a perturbed image as in [15], [2], while a non-targeted
perturbation is to make the network produce any output other
than its original output (output without perturbation) as in
[24], [20], [29]. Furthermore, depending on the properties
of perturbations, they can also be categorized into physical
and digital domain perturbations [6]. The physical domain
attacks aim to generate perturbations based on the geometric
changes, as mentioned in [1], [3], which focus on real-world
distortions due to different viewing distances and angles, light-
ing conditions, camera limitations[3], etc. On the other hand,
digital attacks aim to change the image values with visually
imperceptible modifications. In this paper, we consider both
physical and digital domain perturbations for Im2Im since,
in reality, both perturbations exist and affect the security of
autonomous driving and robotic applications.
III. BACKGROUND: ADVERSARIAL ATTACK FOR IM2IM
In this work, we mainly focus on two representative Im2Im
frameworks, the paired setting [11] and the unpaired setting
[32], commonly used for autonomous driving applications. An
Im2Im model consists of a discriminator D trained to classify
images as real (from the dataset) or fake (generated), and a
generator G trained to fool the discriminator D. At inference
time, the trained generator is used to generate fake images.
The goal is to learn a mapping function from input domain
X (e.g. segmentation labels) to target domain Y (e.g. color
images) given samples {xi}Ni=1 where x∈ X and {yi}Mi=1 where
y ∈ Y . For the paired mapping, M = N. We denote the data
distribution as x ∼ pdata(x) and y ∼ pdata(y). Essentially, the
fundamental objective functional for both paired and unpaired
frameworks follows a minmax game as:
LIm2Im = max
D
min
G
Ey∼pdata(y) [log(D(y)]+
Ex∼pdata(x) [(1− log(D(G(x))]
(1)
Thus, when a generative model for Im2Im is trained, we can
use x∼ pdata(x) to generate images in domain Y .
Regarding adversarial perturbations for Im2Im, a naive way
is to add perturbation to the x ∼ pdata(x) and then try to
optimize the magnitude to get optimal perturbations. However,
Im2Im is essentially different from general classification-based
problems since it does not really have the classifier during
the inference time. Besides, it is worth mentioning that there
is a latent classifier, the discriminator which also determines
the performance of Im2Im in training time. To this end, our
approaches for attacking Im2Im frameworks are two folds. We
first follow the generic way to apply adversarial perturbations
to the generator G only in inference time as shown in Fig. 2 (a),
Fig. 3 (a) and Fig. 4. We also propose to apply perturbations to
the latent classifier. Although it takes the target domain images
(Y ) for discerning real from fake during training, it also needs
to be considered since the adversarial perturbations may be
maliciously added to the target images, and the mapping is
usually bi-directional (Y → X , X → Y ). Thus, as a new idea,
we apply adversarial perturbations to the latent classifier in
training time as shown in the bottom rows in Fig. 2 (b) and
Fig. 3 (b). We aim to estimate how robust is the discriminator
when the perturbations added to target images because these
perturbations provide us guidance on how carefully should we
prepare data and design Im2Im networks.
IV. PROPOSED METHODS
Based on how Im2Im frameworks are applied in au-
tonomous vehicle and robotics, we propose three adversarial
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Fig. 2: An illustration of image-agnostic perturbations for Im2Im
(paired setting) via both domain X (a) in inference time and domain
Y (b) in training time. See more details in the contexts.
perturbation methods to fool the Im2Im networks by consider-
ing the geometric transformations of images [6], [5], modifica-
tion of pixel values [20], [21] and also spatial transformation
[29], [1]. We first focus on digital adversarial perturbations
by adding imperceptible or quasi-imperceptible noise to the
input images through optimization of perturbation. We then
consider the quasi-physical adversarial perturbations such as
transformations of images.
A. Image-agnostic adversarial perturbation
Since recent works, such as [20], [21], [19], have demon-
strated that there exist image-agnostic adversarial perturbations
that could cause the pretrained classifier to misclassify most
of the perturbed inputs. Here, we question whether an image-
agnostic adversarial perturbation could cause any wrong map-
ping from one domain to another in Im2Im tasks, and if yes,
to what extent does it affect domain translation? Hence, we
focus on generating image-agnostic perturbations for images
fed to Im2Im networks and investigate how they affect the
mapping. Our aim is to ultimately fool the generator such
that it fails to generate the expected outputs. As mentioned
in Sec. III, we first apply the image-agnostic adversarial
perturbation to the generator in inference time as done in
most previous works. We also aim to apply image-agnostic
perturbation to the discriminator in the Im2Im models in
training time, and then use pristine input domain images to test
from the trained generator in inference time. Inspired by [20],
[9], which focus on the classification problems, we propose
algorithms for the challenging Im2Im problems and apply to
autonomous driving. We consider the generation of image-
agnostic adversarial perturbations under paired and unpaired
settings. As shown in Fig. 2 (a), the generator aims to map
x ∼ pdata(x) (e.g. segmentation labels) to y ∼ pdata(y) (e.g.
color images) under the paired setting. When image-agnostic
perturbations are applied to the input domain X in inference
time, the generator takes the inputs and generate the color
images in domain Y . When perturbations are added to y ∼
pdata(y), the discriminator learns to classify the synthesized
and real {x, perturbed y} tuple. After training, x ∼ pdata(x)
are then fed to generate color images in domain Y .
We now formulate the image-agnostic perturbations and
propose an approach on how to generate such perturbations
for Im2Im. As shown in Fig. 2 (a), we first aim to fool the
trained generator. Given a set of labels X = {x1, ...,xn} as
Fig. 3: An illustration of flow-based perturbation for fooling Im2Im
(paired setting) via both domain X (a) in inference time and Y (b) in
training time. See more details in the contexts.
inputs and color images Y = {x1, ...,xn} as targets in paired
setting, where n is the total number of images, we seek to
generate perturbation Ξ that can fool the pretrained DNN-
based classifier C (e.g. VGG-19) on most images sampled
from distribution µ in domain X or Y using the boundary
threshold ξ , which can be formulated as ||Ξ||p ≤ ξ . Note that
the labels predicted by C do not need to be always true since
we care more about finding the optimal perturbation for Im2Im
tasks and our aim is then to find the minimal perturbation
Ξmin. Meanwhile, to guarantee that the constraint ||Ξ||p ≤ ξ
is always satisfied, we refer to the method proposed by [21],
[20], where the updated perturbation is further projected on
the lp ball of radius ξ and centered at zero. Denote Pξ (Ξ) as
the projection operator defined as follows:
Pξ (Ξ) = argmin
Ξ′
||Ξ−Ξ′||2 s.t. ||Ξ′||p ≤ ξ (2)
where Ξ is updated by Ξ′← Pξ (Ξ+∆Ξ). Besides, the pertur-
bation we aim to find is also controlled by δ related to the
desired fooling rate for the images sampled from µ [21], and
satisfies the constraint as follows:
Px∼µ(C(x+Ξ) 6=C(x))≥ 1−δ (3)
where δ quantifies the desired fooling rate for all images
sampled from the distribution µ . Note that Eq. 3 is directly
optimizable (see Table. I). We then use these misclassified
images (X or Y ) to attack the Im2Im networks. To guarantee
that the generated outputs G(IΞ) are mostly mis-classified by
the discriminator (see Fig. 2 (b)), we define the objective,
which is also optimizable for the input domain:
argmin
Ξ
||Ξ||p s.t. D(G(IΞ)) 6= D(G(I)). (4)
And, for the target domain, the objective is defined as:
argmin
Ξ
||Ξ||p s.t. D(IΞ) 6= D(I). (5)
Hence, when the magnitude of the image-agnostic perturbation
is smaller than threshold ξ , it is desirable to maintain the
high fooling rate for both X and Y , which can further fool the
discriminator to wrongly distinguish fake from real and thus
allow generating less reliable or wrong outputs.
B. Flow-based adversarial perturbation
The adversarial perturbation can happen not only by pixel
value change but also by pixel position shift in an image.
Shifting pixel positions will lead to large lp norm difference,
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however, it does not severely affect human perception [29].
Here, we propose a novel flow-based adversarial perturbation
aiming to fool Im2Im.
Our aim is to ultimately fool the generator via flow-based
adversarial perturbation such that it fails to generate the
expected results. As mentioned in Sec. III, we first apply the
flow-based adversarial perturbation to the pretrained generator
as done in most previous works. We also aim to fool the latent
classifier by applying flow-based perturbations to images in the
target domain Y in training time, and then feed pristine images
in the input domain X to the trained generator. We use IkΞ to
denote the pixel values of the k-th pixel and 2D coordinate
(ukΞ, v
k
Ξ) to denote its location in the adversarial example IΞ.
Here, we assume IkΞ is transformed from the pixel I
k in the
original image I. We consider per-pixel flow (displacement)
field f to synthesize the perturbed image IΞ using pixels from
the input I in order to fool the generator in Im2Im. For the k-th
pixel within IkΞ at pixel location (u
k
Ξ,v
k
Ξ), we aim to generate
perturbations while minimizing the amount of displacement
in each image dimension, with the pair denoted by the flow
vector fk := (∆uk,∆vk). The flow vector from fk goes from a
pixel in the adversarial example IkΞ to its corresponding pixel
Ik in the input image I. As shown in Fig. 3 for paired setting,
the location of its corresponding pixel Ik can be derived as
the IΞ of the adversarial example as the pixel location of input
I can be modeled as (uk, vk) = (ukΞ + ∆u
k, vkΞ + ∆v
k) where
(uk, vk) represents the pixel location in the original image.
The perturbed image IΞ is then applied to conditional inputs
fed to the generator or directly applied to targets. Note that k-
th pixel coordinate: (uk, vk) can be fractional numbers and
may not lie on the integer image grid. To better optimize
the adversarial example IΞ, we apply differentiable bilinear
interpolation [29], [12] to transform I with flow field f . Thus,
for the k-th pixel and its neighboring pixel j, the perturbed
image can be formulated as follows:
IΞk = ∑
j∈N(uk,vk)
I j(1−|uk−u j|)(1−|vk− v j|) (6)
where N(uk,vk) are the indices of the 4-pixel neighbors at
the location (uk, vk), namely top-left, top-right, bottom-left
and bottom-right. Note that (1−|uk−u j|)(1−|vk−v j|) is the
bilinear sampling kernel defining the gradients with respect to
original image I in spatial location. Thus, we can easily get
the flow-based adversarial example IΞ by calculating the Eq. 6,
for every pixel IkΞ. The goal of spatial flow transformation
is to guarantee effective IΞ while ensuring the magnitude of
the perturbation is bounded by a threshold ξ f as in [2]. The
objective for the attack can be formulated the same as the
Eq. 4 and Eq. 5 while satisfying :
argmin
fn
|| fk− fn||2 s.t. || fn||p ≤ ξ f (7)
where fn is the updated flow from Eq. 7, and the flow loss
L f low can be computed via the sum of spatial displacements.
Given a pixel i and neighboring pixels j ∈ N(i), the loss of
a flow-based perturbation, which is directly optimizable (see
Table. I), is calculated based on the total variation [29] as:
L f low =
all
∑
i
∑
j∈N(i)
√
||∆ui−∆u j||22+ ||∆vi−∆v j||22 (8)
Thus, the goal of the flow-based perturbation is to fool Im2Im
while maintaining the perceptual quality of both the input
domain X ( Fig. 3 (a)) and the target domain Y (Fig. 3 (b)).
C. Quasi-physical adversarial perturbation
A physical perturbation may happen when the physical
relation between the camera and the scene (i.e. distance, view-
ing position and angle) changes. Based on this observation,
we propose a quasi-physical adversarial perturbation, which
mimics the actual physical perturbation. We call quai-physical
adversarial perturbation since the images are transformed
without real change of camera poses but with the scene
changes in the digital domain. Actually, image transforma-
tions such as rotation, translation, and scaling appear natural
to human, but we confirm that they alone can cause significant
performance deterioration of the Im2Im models as shown in
Fig. 4. In this method, our aim is to fool the generative
model by applying quasi-physical adversarial perturbation.
A perturbation or an adversarial example can be defined as
follows: for a given image I, when added a perturbation Ξ,
the image will become an adversarial example IΞ, which is
the summation as I + Ξ. In classification problems, adversarial
examples are aimed to cause a classifier to misclassify the
perturbed image without causing severe perceptible artifacts.
Previous works tackle the problem while presuming that
the perturbed image IΞ and the original image I are close
if and only if ||IΞ−I||p ≤ ξ for p ∈ {0,∞} while ξ is
small enough. However, for the Im2Im problem, we aim to
generate quasi-physical perturbations such that undesirable
instances are generated as outputs but without causing too
much discriminator loss. We apply rotation, translation, and
scaling, which change given images significantly in terms of lp
norm, however, do not affect human perception much as shown
in Fig. 4. To represent the quasi-physical adversarial attacks
to the Im2Im networks in terms of translation, rotation, and
scaling, we define parameters (δu, δv, θ , sx, sy), respectively.
This similarity transformation can be expressed as follows
when the center of image is assumed to be the origin:[
u’
v’
]
=
[
sx 0
0 sy
][
cosθ −sinθ
sinθ cosθ
][
u
v
]
+
[
∆u
∆v
]
(9)
By defining the spatial transformation for the attack domain,
we construct an adversarial perturbation for I by solving the
problem for all transformation TS( δu, δv, θ , sx, sy):
argmax
TS
L(Irec, Itarget) (10)
where L is the loss function, which can be directly obtained
from l1 or l2 norm, Irec is the generated image, and Itarget is the
target image to which we want to map. Our aim is to find the
minimal spatial transformation that could cause the maximum
loss for Im2Im tasks. However, since the loss function is
differentiable with respect to inputs but not differentiable with
respect to the parameters of transformations, the objective here
is not directly optimizable as shown in Table. I.
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Fig. 4: An illustration of quasi-physical adversarial perturbation for
Im2Im. Geometrically transformed images in domain A can be
adversarial examples for mapping to domain Y . When the original
segmentation labels (first column) from input domain X are inten-
tionally transformed (translation, rotation and scale) to the adversarial
examples (second column), they fail to be mapped to the correct color
images in target domain Y .
TABLE I: A summary of the proposed methods regarding their
attack domains and whether they are directly optimizable or not.
!/7indicates yes/no. Method A and B are applied to both domains,
and method C is only applied to X and not directly optimizable.
Method domain X domain Y Optimizable
A (image-agnostic) ! ! !
B (flow-based) ! ! !
C (quasi-physical) ! 7 7
V. EXPERIMENT AND EVALUATION
We first conduct systematic experiments to substantiate the
proposed adversarial perturbations against paired Im2Im net-
work [11], using the Cityscapes dataset [4]. We then conduct
experiments using the proposed three methods against the
unpaired framework [32], using both Cityscapes and ImageNet
datasets [4], [13]. Finally, we evaluate both perceptual realism
and performance in real applications (e.g. semantic segmen-
tation). We focus on the analysis of perceptual realism and
diversity using the Learned Perceptual Image Patch Similarity
(LPIPS)1 metric proposed in [31]. To measure whether the
generated images with perturbations are able to be used for
real tasks or not, we then refer to the FCN-8s for pixel-wise
semantic segmentation as in [11].
A. Perturbations under paired setting
Image-agnostic adversarial perturbation. In this experi-
ment, we apply image-agnostic adversarial perturbation under
paired setting. Results are obtained from p = {2,∞}, together
with the ξ = {10, 200, 500, 1000, 2000} controlling the mag-
nitude of the perturbation. Meanwhile, we also consider the
fooling rate hyper-parameter δ = {0.2, 0.6}, controlling the
rate for prior misclassification. Fig. 5 and Fig. 1 (second row)
show the generated outputs when applying the perturbations
to inputs (labels), compared with the original outputs (third
column). The results show that image-agnostic perturbation is
effective. For instance, the unseen perturbations in the inputs
and targets cause the erroneous mapping of pedestrians and
vehicles, and distortion of roads, etc. The results can also be
1LPIPS metric calculates the distance in the AlexNet feature space to better
match human perception.
Fig. 5: Visual results of image-agnostic perturbations on Cityscapes
dataset under paired setting, compared with original outputs. The
first row shows output when applying perturbations to the input
(labels x) with Pu: {δ ,ξ , p}={0.2,10,∞}, and the last row depicts
the output when applying perturbations to the target images (y)
with Pu: {δ ,ξ , p}={0.2,1000,∞}. From left to right, the perturbed
input (first row) and the original input (second row), outputs with
perturbation, original outputs, and the visualization of perturbations.
TABLE II: LPIPS scores of image-agnostic perturbations for both
domain X (labels x) and Y (color images y). Convincingly, all
the outputs with perturbation (PO) get scores much greater than
the reference (0.32 ±0.06 (O (original outputs) vs It (target color
images)), which indicates that the outputs are not trustable and
unnatural. See more details in the contexts.
Pu{δ ,ξ , p} PO vs O PO vs It PI vs Iorig
{0.2,10,∞} (input) 0.32±0.04 0.41±0.06 0.14±0.03
{0.2,10,∞} (target) 0.43±0.04 0.54±0.05 0.18±0.06
{0.2,200,∞} (input) 0.41±0.06 0.51±0.05 0.19±0.04
{0.2,200,∞} (target) 0.51±0.03 0.58±0.04 0.27±0.07
{0.2,500,∞} (input) 0.34±0.04 0.42±0.06 0.20±0.04
{0.2,500,∞} (target) 0.52±0.03 0.58±0.04 0.27±0.07
{0.2,1000,∞} (input) 0.33±0.04 0.43±0.06 0.19±0.04
{0.2,1000,∞} (target) 0.53±0.03 0.60±0.03 0.28±0.08
{0.2,2000,2} (input) 0.33±0.03 0.43±0.05 0.12±0.03
{0.2,2000,2} (target) 0.41±0.03 0.50±0.04 0.16±0.05
{0.2,2000,∞} (input) 0.34±0.04 0.45±0.06 0.20±0.04
{0.2,2000,∞} (target) 0.51±0.03 0.57±0.03 0.29±0.08
{0.6,1000,2} (input) 0.34±0.04 0.42±0.05 0.03±0.01
{0.6,1000,2} (target) 0.33±0.04 0.44±0.06 0.04±0.01
validated numerically as in Table II, where we can see that
most outputs with perturbation (PO) are perceptually quite
different compared to the original outputs (O) as shown in the
second column where most LPIPS scores > 0.5 (the higher
LPIPS scores, the worse and unnatural perceptual realism).
Besides, the POs are also quite different from the targets (It )
in domain Y . More convincingly, all POs get scores much
greater than the reference 0.32 ±0.06 (O vs It ), which indicates
that the outputs are not trustable and unnatural. However, the
difference of perturbed images (either inputs or targets) versus
the original images (PI vs Iorig) is mostly imperceptible to
humans (LPIPS < 0.3).
Flow-based adversarial perturbation: We then apply flow-
based perturbation method on both both inputs (labels x)
and targets (color images y). Fig 6 shows the outputs from
our method (second column), compared with the original
outputs (third column). We can see that by taking the flow
information of pixels, the adversary could cause serious attacks
on mappings of vehicles, people, and even lanes from seg-
mentation labels. Besides, the magnitudes of flows near object
boundaries are usually larger than those in other regions, and it
indicates that object boundaries are crucial for mapping from
one domain to the other. The results can be also numerically
verified from Table III, where we can see that the outputs
with our method (PO) are distinctively different from original
target color images (It ) and also original outputs (LPIPS> 0.5),
while the perturbed input or target images (PI) do not visually
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Fig. 6: Experimental results of flow-based adversarial perturbations
on Cityscapes under paired setting. From left to right, the perturbed
inputs (labels x), outputs with perturbations, outputs without perturba-
tions, and visualization of flow, where ξ f ={1,2}, respectively (from
top to bottom). Our method is effective to attack the Im2Im and make
it yield undesired outputs.
TABLE III: LPIPS scores of flow-based adversarial perturbations for
both domain X and Y . The outputs with our methods yield much
higher LPIPS scores compared to the original outputs O vs target
images It (0.32±0.06)). See more details in the contexts.
ξ f PO vs It PO vs O PI vs Iorig
1 (input) 0.43±0.05 0.33±0.03 0.05±0.01
1 (target) 0.44±0.05 0.34±0.03 0.08±0.02
2 (input) 0.43±0.05 0.33±0.03 0.12±0.02
2 (target) 0.48±0.06 0.40±0.04 0.20±0.04
3 (input) 0.42±0.05 0.33±0.03 0.19±0.02
3 (target) 0.53±0.06 0.46±0.03 0.30±0.05
4 (input) 0.44±0.06 0.34±0.03 0.24±0.03
4 (target) 0.58±0.06 0.52±0.04 0.39±0.06
TABLE IV: Variation of FCN-scores for the outputs with perturba-
tions added to label (domain X) and color (domain Y ) w.r.t the change
of flow of hyper-parameter ξ f . See more details in the contexts.
ξ f Per-pixel acc. Per-class acc. Class IOU
1 (label) 0.37 0.18 0.12
1 (color) 0.32 0.15 0.11
2 (label) 0.35 0.12 0.14
2 (color) 0.27 0.14 0.09
3 (label) 0.30 0.16 0.10
3 (color) 0.23 0.11 0.05
4 (label) 0.30 0.15 0.08
4 (color) 0.22 0.10 0.09
Original output 0.66 0.23 0.17
differ too much compared to the original images Iorig (LPIPS
< 0.25). Besides, in Table. IV, outputs with our method
yield lower FCN-scores compared to the original outputs (Per-
pixel acc.: 0.66, Per-class acc.: 0.23 and Class IOU: 0.17).
Meanwhile, perturbations added to labels mostly show higher
scores than perturbations to color images, while FCN-scores
of both decrease with the increment of flow parameter ξ f ,
and it indicates these color outputs with perturbations severely
degrade the performance for the semantic segmentation task.
Quasi-physical adversarial perturbation. In order to main-
tain the visual similarity of perturbed images to the original
images, we restrict the magnitude of allowed perturbations
to be relatively small for both conditional inputs and targets,
without applying any modifications of pixel values. We con-
sider 0.5◦ rotation (R) each time, translations (T ) less than
around 10 % of a network input image size, and scaling
(S). More explicitly, we experiment on the perturbations
with R = {0◦,0.5◦,1◦,1.5◦,2◦,2.5◦,3◦,3.5◦} combined with
S = {0.85,0.95} and T = {10,20} (in pixels). When applying
scale, rotation, and translation, the blank regions are all filled
with black pixels. As shown in Fig. 7, we can see that tiny
magnitude of perturbation adding to inputs (labels) could cause
serious attacks in the outputs, such as missing building, ve-
hicles, pedestrians, traffic lights, etc. This reflects that current
Fig. 7: Experimental results for the quasi-physical adversarial pertur-
bation. First column shows perturbed inputs (S=0.95), followed by
output with our method, original output and target color image. From
the output with perturbation, we can see small transformations can
cause serious attacks (fail to map people and vehicles).
Fig. 8: Experimental results of image-agnostic adversarial pertur-
bations on Im2Im for style transfer. From left to right, original
input, perturbed input, output with our method, original outputs,
and visualization of perturbations (Pu{δ ,ξ , p} = {0.2,10, inf} and
{0.2,2000, inf}). See more details in the contexts.
Im2Im networks are vulnerable to physical and quasi-physical
adversarial perturbations and need to be improved to deal with
such perturbations. Numerically, it also turns out that outputs
with our perturbation (PO) are quite visually different from
the original outputs (O) and also the targets It (color images),
which indicates that the outputs are unnatural.
B. Perturbations under unpaired setting
Unpaired mapping has been applied to generate diverse
driving environments via style transfer (e.g. day to night,
winter to spring) [32], [10] or domain adaptation of semantic
segmentation for autonomous vehicles [33]. In this experiment,
we show the experimental results on the baseline structure [32]
using the Cityscapes and ImageNet datasets. Here, we show
the robustness of our methods based on both datasets to attack
example-guided style transfer, which aims at modifying the
style of an image while preserving its content.
Image-agnostic adversarial perturbation. We set hyper-
parameters as p = {2,∞}, together with the ξ = {10, 500,
1000, 2000} and fooling rate hyper-parameter δ = {0.2, 0.6}.
In Fig. 8, we can clearly see when the perturbation is applied, a
zebra fails to be transferred to horse. This indicates our method
is effective enough to impede the style transfer in autonomous
driving (e.g. fail to generate diverse driving environments). In
the second row, we can see that there exists image-agnostic
perturbation which could demolish the transfer from input
(label) to the target (color image) as shown in the third column,
compared with the original output in the fourth column. The
existence of adversarial perturbation causes serious attack on
the mapping of cars, lane, building from input.
Flow-based adversarial perturbation. We have also tested
the unpaired mapping with flow-based perturbations on Im2Im
style transfer. We assign hyper-parameter ξ f = {1,2,3,4} to
flow-based perturbations for both domains (inputs and targets).
Fig. 9 and Fig. 1(third row) show some examples of outputs
with flow-based perturbation. As can be seen in Fig. 9, the out-
puts with our method are still horse images, not zebra images
as we expect. Meanwhile, the input also fails to be mapped
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Fig. 9: Experimental results of flow-based adversarial perturbations
on Im2Im for style transfer. The first column shows the pristine
horse image, followed by the flow-transformed images with tiny
perturbations shown in the last column ( fξ = 1 and fξ = 2). The
third column depicts the outputs with our method, compared with
the original outputs in the fourth column.
TABLE V: LPIPS scores of flow-based adversarial perturbations
under unpaired setting. See more details in the contexts.
ξ f PO vs O PI vs I
AtoB BtoA Pert. ratio
1 (A) 0.43 ±0.05 0.45±0.07 0.09 ±0.05
1 (B) 0.41 ±0.05 0.38±0.05 0.12 ±0.04
2 (A) 0.50 ±0.08 0.51±0.07 0.18 ±0.05
2 (B) 0.49 ±0.07 0.47±0.07 0.19 ±0.09
3 (A) 0.52 ±0.07 0.53±0.07 0.23 ±0.08
3 (B) 0.51 ±0.05 0.50±0.07 0.25 ±0.09
Fig. 10: Visual results with quasi-physical adversarial perturbations
for style transfer on ImageNet dataset. From left to right, the first and
fourth columns show the inputs, and the second and fifth columns
show the perturbed outputs with rotated horse image (2◦), compared
with original outputs in the third and sixth columns.
to the target (third column). More serious situations happen
with larger flow transformations, which would even cause
serious attacks on the mapping of patterns. The effectiveness
of our method can also be numerically verified in Table. V,
where the outputs with perturbation (PO) are semantically and
textually different from original outputs (O) (LPIPS ≥ 0.5).
However, the perturbed input (PI) are visually similar to the
original images (I) (LPIPS ≤ 0.25). The results also reflect
that flow-based perturbation is effective on fooling Im2Im for
autonomous driving. For instance, the adversarial examples
might impede the transfer for driving scenes (e.g. night to
daytime). Besides, they can also cause serious attacks on the
transfer from simulated domain to real domain.
Quasi-physical adversarial perturbation. We again apply
the quasi-physical adversarial perturbation style transfer task.
Fig. 10 shows some outputs from quasi-physical adversarial
perturbations. As can be seen, a simple rotation with 2◦ of
horse images (domain B) disrupts the mapping, which makes
a zebra still mapped to a zebra. The experiment on Cityscapes
dataset under unpaired setting also show the similar results as
shown in Fig. 7 under paired setting. The results indicate that
our method could also cause attacks on soiling and adverse
weather classification for autonomous driving as done in [28].
VI. DISCUSSION
Generalization. We have tested the perturbations on both
paired and unpaired settings on various datasets. Our method
is effective to attack Im2Im (e.g. labels fail to be mapped
to color images with loss of vehicles, people and lanes, and
Fig. 11: Variation of LPIPS scores with respect to the change of the
image-agnostic perturbation hyper-parameter ξ tested on horse2zebra
examples. Note that Pert.AtoB indicates the mapping output of the
perturbed horse images (domain A) to zebras (domain B), and others
(e.g. Pert.BtoA) have similar indications. Pert.AtoB vs AtoB means
the perceptual comparison between the outputs of Pert.AtoB and the
outputs of AtoB (horse to zebra), and other notations are of similar
indications. See more details in the contexts.
style transfer (one pattern to another) for autonomous driving
applications. In the future work, it is plausible to apply defense
method based on our attack methods.
How adversarial perturbations affect Im2Im? We have
shown that our proposed methods are effective enough to fool
the Im2Im frameworks for autonomous driving. Our methods
can illustrate how the perceptual quality of outputs varies
with respect to the change of perturbations. Take image-
agnostic adversarial perturbation as an example, from the
LPIPS scores shown in Fig 11, we can see that the perturba-
tions have the highest fooling rate when ξ = 500 (threshold),
where LPIPS scores of most outputs (horse2zebra (AtoB)
and zebra2horse (BtoA)) culminate. This indicates that, when
Pu = {0.2,500,∞}, the most unnatural images are generated.
Meanwhile, when ξ increases from 500, the LPIPS score
decreases, and it shows that the mapping is rather disrupted.
However, the LPIPS scores between perturbed images (PI) and
original images (I) are almost flattened, indicating perturbed
images are natural and perturbations are imperceptible.
Difference from classification problems. Adversarial attack
for DNN aimed for classification is essentially deterministic
and objective than Im2Im frameworks (without class labels).
Attacking Im2Im is more knotty since it is from one domain
to the other, which renders the problem challenging. We thus
propose to apply perturbation mechanisms to the discriminator
in training phase since the target images are fed to it to tell real
from fake. By examining the discriminator towards adversarial
perturbations, it help us to understand more clearly about
Im2Im networks and their vulnerability.
New perspectives for Im2Im. In this work, the study of
adversarial perturbations for Im2Im provides us new outlooks
on how to improve the design of Im2Im networks and the
preparation of dataset. First of all, as shown in Fig. 2, 6,
perturbations to target domain causes more severe degradation
of outputs, thus it is better to design more robust discriminator
to better distinguish fake from real. Second, since physical
perturbation has strong impact on the outputs of Im2Im (Fig. 7
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and Fig. 10), it is better to avoid using the scenes in images that
have large view transformations. Third, since we have showed
that failure of outputs is also caused by the perturbations
intentionally or unintentionally added to the dataset, it is
crucial to apply defensive approaches to the dataset to used for
training and test. Lastly, since the generator is sensitive to the
perturbations to the input, it is better to design the generator
that takes additional information for better domain mapping.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have demonstrated how our proposed
methods cam successfully fool the Im2Im frameworks for
autonomous driving applications. We first proposed three novel
and initiative perturbation methods for both paired (labels
→ color) and unpaired settings (style transfer). We then
conducted intensive experiments to validate our methods and
evaluated the results using various perceptual realism metrics.
Since we conventionally trust what we see from the outputs,
perturbations that can easily demolish mapping from domain
to domain and impede the utilization of generated results
should be considered as threatening factors for autonomous
vehicles. It turns out that these visually imperceptible or quasi-
imperceptible perturbations could actually provide potential
outlooks for the security of applying Im2Im networks to
autonomous driving research. We are currently exploiting to
improve the robustness of Im2Im networks for more secure
autonomous driving and robotic applicaions.
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